הפערים החדשים: הסכמי גג כמנגנון לאי־שוויון מרחבי

The mechanism of the “umbrella agreements,” which was part of the response to the housing crisis of 2011, was intended to significantly increase the supply of housing by mitigating the opposition of local authorities to residential construction in their territory. An umbrella agreement stipulates that the local authority agrees to the construction of thousands of housing units on state-owned land within its territory,while the government transfers a portion of the marketing proceeds for the building of infrastructure. Such transactions, in which each of the parties has duties and profits and which are motivated by considerations of entrepreneurial and budgetary profit, have characterized the neoliberal city in recent decades, but they were “rescaled” to the state level following the 2011 housing crisis. This study shows that, like the planning transactions that are common in Israeli urban planning, and which deepen inequality,the umbrella agreements widen the gaps that exist between weak and strong authorities.In this context, weak authorities sign agreements that prove harmful to the city and its residents, while the powerful sign agreements that prove beneficial. This phenomenon results from the nature of the umbrella agreement mechanism, as well as from the implementation of a government housing policy that relies on land values and entrepreneurial concepts, instead of on the housing needs of the citizens of the cities and the country.