Abstract
In this paper we establish, contrary to conventional wisdom, a case for taxing education, as a supplement to the labor income tax, by drawing on some informational feature of education, which the government may utilize. Discretionary decisions of individuals to acquire education may serve as an additional signal (to earned labor income) on the underlying unobserved innate earning ability, thereby mitigating the informational constraint faced by the government.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 145-163 |
Number of pages | 19 |
Journal | International Tax and Public Finance |
Volume | 15 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Apr 2008 |
Keywords
- Education
- Inequality
- Optimal taxation
- Re-distribution
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Accounting
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics