A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution

Nir Dagan; Oscar Volij; Eyal Winter

doi:10.1007/s003550200159

A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution

Nir Dagan, Oscar Volij, Eyal Winter

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

23 Scopus citations

Abstract

We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting, and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	811-823
Number of pages	13
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	19
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550200159
State	Published - 1 Oct 2002
Externally published	Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics

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title = "A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution",

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A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution

Abstract

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