A Learning Approach to Auctions

Shlomit Hon-Snir, Dov Monderer, Aner Sela

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

37 Scopus citations


We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It is proved that if every player is using either a belief-based learning scheme with bounded recall or a generalized fictitious play learning scheme, then after sufficiently long time, the players' bids are in equilibrium in the one-shot auction in which the types are commonly known.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D44, D83.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)65-88
Number of pages24
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number1
StatePublished - 1 Sep 1998
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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