A Learning Approach to Auctions

Shlomit Hon-Snir; Dov Monderer; Aner Sela

doi:10.1006/jeth.1998.2419

A Learning Approach to Auctions

Shlomit Hon-Snir, Dov Monderer, Aner Sela

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

39 Scopus citations

Abstract

We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It is proved that if every player is using either a belief-based learning scheme with bounded recall or a generalized fictitious play learning scheme, then after sufficiently long time, the players' bids are in equilibrium in the one-shot auction in which the types are commonly known.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D44, D83.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	65-88
Number of pages	24
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	82
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2419
State	Published - 1 Sep 1998
Externally published	Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1006/jeth.1998.2419

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AB - We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It is proved that if every player is using either a belief-based learning scheme with bounded recall or a generalized fictitious play learning scheme, then after sufficiently long time, the players' bids are in equilibrium in the one-shot auction in which the types are commonly known.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D44, D83.

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A Learning Approach to Auctions

Abstract

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