A local-dominance theory of voting equilibria

Reshef Meir, Omer Lev, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

47 Scopus citations

Abstract

We suggest a new model for strategic voting based on local dominance, where voters consider a set of possible outcomes without assigning probabilities to them. We prove that voting equilibria under the Plurality rule exist for a broad class of local dominance relations. Furthermore, we show that local dominance-based dynamics quickly converge to an equilibrium if voters start from the truthful state, and we provide weaker convergence guarantees in more general settings. Using extensive simulations of strategic voting on generated and real profiles, we show that emerging equilibria replicate widely known patterns of human voting behavior such as Duverger's law, and that they generally improve the quality of the winner compared to non-strategic voting.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEC 2014 - Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
Pages313-330
Number of pages18
ISBN (Print)9781450325653
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2014
Externally publishedYes
Event15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2014 - Palo Alto, CA, United States
Duration: 8 Jun 201412 Jun 2014

Publication series

NameEC 2014 - Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

Conference

Conference15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2014
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityPalo Alto, CA
Period8/06/1412/06/14

Keywords

  • equilibrium
  • local dominance
  • strategic voting
  • strict uncertainty

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science (miscellaneous)

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