A non-cooperative interpretation of bargaining sets

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Abstract

This paper provides a non-cooperative interpretation for bargaining sets concepts in economic environments. We investigate the implementability of the Aumann-Maschler and Mas-Colell bargaining sets, and provide mechanisms whose subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes realize these sets. These mechanisms, in contrast to general mechanisms suggested in the implementation literature, have a natural structure closely related to that of the rationale underlying the bargaining sets. Furthermore, the strategy sets consist mainly of allocations and coalitions (thus avoiding any reference to preference parameters) and are finite dimensional.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)219-230
Number of pages12
JournalReview of Economic Design
Volume4
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 1999

Keywords

  • Bargaining sets
  • Implementation

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