A non-lexicographic rule in the preference-approval setting

Guy Barokas

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111124

A non-lexicographic rule in the preference-approval setting

Guy Barokas

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

We present the first non-lexicographic social ranking rule in the preference-approval setting. Our rule is obtained using three well-known axioms and a novel symmetry axiom, which balances preferences and approval information, thereby avoiding the extreme outcomes seen in existing lexicographic methods. Other non-lexicographic alternatives are discussed.

Original language	English
Article number	111124
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	227
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111124
State	Published - 1 Jun 2023
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

No priority
Preference-approval
Social choice

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111124

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title = "A non-lexicographic rule in the preference-approval setting",

abstract = "We present the first non-lexicographic social ranking rule in the preference-approval setting. Our rule is obtained using three well-known axioms and a novel symmetry axiom, which balances preferences and approval information, thereby avoiding the extreme outcomes seen in existing lexicographic methods. Other non-lexicographic alternatives are discussed.",

keywords = "No priority, Preference-approval, Social choice",

author = "Guy Barokas",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2023 Elsevier B.V.",

year = "2023",

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doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111124",

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AU - Barokas, Guy

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N2 - We present the first non-lexicographic social ranking rule in the preference-approval setting. Our rule is obtained using three well-known axioms and a novel symmetry axiom, which balances preferences and approval information, thereby avoiding the extreme outcomes seen in existing lexicographic methods. Other non-lexicographic alternatives are discussed.

AB - We present the first non-lexicographic social ranking rule in the preference-approval setting. Our rule is obtained using three well-known axioms and a novel symmetry axiom, which balances preferences and approval information, thereby avoiding the extreme outcomes seen in existing lexicographic methods. Other non-lexicographic alternatives are discussed.

KW - No priority

KW - Preference-approval

KW - Social choice

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85153935590

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111124

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111124

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85153935590

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 227

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

M1 - 111124

ER -

A non-lexicographic rule in the preference-approval setting

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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