TY - UNPB
T1 - A Political Model of Trust
AU - Agranov, Marina
AU - Eilat, Ran
AU - Sonin, Konstantin
N1 - Agranov, Marina and Eilat, Ran and Sonin, Konstantin, A Political Model of Trust (April 25, 2020). University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2020-50
PY - 2020/4/27
Y1 - 2020/4/27
N2 - We analyze a simple model of political competition, in which the uninformed median voter chooses whether to follow or ignore the advice of the informed elites. In equilibrium, information transmission is possible only if voters trust the elites' endorsement of potentially biased candidates. When inequality is high, the elites' informational advantage is minimized by the voters' distrust. When inequality reaches a certain threshold, the trust, and thus the information transmission, breaks down completely. Finally, the size of the elite forming in equilibrium depends on the amount of trust they are able to maintain.
AB - We analyze a simple model of political competition, in which the uninformed median voter chooses whether to follow or ignore the advice of the informed elites. In equilibrium, information transmission is possible only if voters trust the elites' endorsement of potentially biased candidates. When inequality is high, the elites' informational advantage is minimized by the voters' distrust. When inequality reaches a certain threshold, the trust, and thus the information transmission, breaks down completely. Finally, the size of the elite forming in equilibrium depends on the amount of trust they are able to maintain.
U2 - 10.2139/ssrn.3585370
DO - 10.2139/ssrn.3585370
M3 - Working paper
BT - A Political Model of Trust
PB - Becker Friedman Institute
ER -