A remark on bargaining and non-expected utility

Oscar Volij

doi:10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00009-4

A remark on bargaining and non-expected utility

Oscar Volij

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

We show that a bargaining game of alternating offers with exogenous risk of breakdown and played by dynamically consistent non-expected utility maximizers is formally equivalent to Rubinstein's [Econometrica 50 (1982) 97] game with time preference. Within this game, the behavior of dynamically consistent players is indistinguishable from the behavior of expected utility maximizers.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	17-24
Number of pages	8
Journal	Mathematical Social Sciences
Volume	44
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00009-4
State	Published - 19 Aug 2002
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Bargaining
Compound lotteries
Dynamic consistency

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Sociology and Political Science
General Social Sciences
General Psychology
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

Access to Document

10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00009-4

Cite this

@article{177a77683f4b4148bf61c90e414e149d,

title = "A remark on bargaining and non-expected utility",

abstract = "We show that a bargaining game of alternating offers with exogenous risk of breakdown and played by dynamically consistent non-expected utility maximizers is formally equivalent to Rubinstein's [Econometrica 50 (1982) 97] game with time preference. Within this game, the behavior of dynamically consistent players is indistinguishable from the behavior of expected utility maximizers.",

keywords = "Bargaining, Compound lotteries, Dynamic consistency",

author = "Oscar Volij",

year = "2002",

month = aug,

day = "19",

doi = "10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00009-4",

language = "English",

volume = "44",

pages = "17--24",

journal = "Mathematical Social Sciences",

issn = "0165-4896",

publisher = "Elsevier B.V.",

number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - A remark on bargaining and non-expected utility

AU - Volij, Oscar

PY - 2002/8/19

Y1 - 2002/8/19

N2 - We show that a bargaining game of alternating offers with exogenous risk of breakdown and played by dynamically consistent non-expected utility maximizers is formally equivalent to Rubinstein's [Econometrica 50 (1982) 97] game with time preference. Within this game, the behavior of dynamically consistent players is indistinguishable from the behavior of expected utility maximizers.

AB - We show that a bargaining game of alternating offers with exogenous risk of breakdown and played by dynamically consistent non-expected utility maximizers is formally equivalent to Rubinstein's [Econometrica 50 (1982) 97] game with time preference. Within this game, the behavior of dynamically consistent players is indistinguishable from the behavior of expected utility maximizers.

KW - Bargaining

KW - Compound lotteries

KW - Dynamic consistency

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0036343829&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00009-4

DO - 10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00009-4

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0036343829

SN - 0165-4896

VL - 44

SP - 17

EP - 24

JO - Mathematical Social Sciences

JF - Mathematical Social Sciences

IS - 1

ER -

A remark on bargaining and non-expected utility

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this