A Survey of the Sensitivities of Security Oriented Flip-Flop Circuits

Itamar Levi; Netanel Miller; Elad Avni; Osnat Keren; Alexander Fish

doi:10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2766243

A Survey of the Sensitivities of Security Oriented Flip-Flop Circuits

Itamar Levi, Netanel Miller, Elad Avni, Osnat Keren, Alexander Fish

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

Side channel attacks have become a major threat to hardware systems. Most modern digital IC designs utilize sequential elements which dominate the information leakage. This paper reports the first unified analysis and comprehensive comparison of known secure flip-flop circuits. We present a device level analysis of the information leakage from these FFs and propose several evaluation metrics to quantify their security. We show that simulated PA attacks that utilize the information evaluated by these metrics at the gate-level extract more information at the module-level.

Original language	English
Article number	8094119
Pages (from-to)	24797-24809
Number of pages	13
Journal	IEEE Access
Volume	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2766243
State	Published - 1 Nov 2017
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

CPA
Cryptography
DPA
countermeasures
flip-flops
power analysis
sequential-circuits
synchronous

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Computer Science (all)
Materials Science (all)
Engineering (all)

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10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2766243

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title = "A Survey of the Sensitivities of Security Oriented Flip-Flop Circuits",

abstract = "Side channel attacks have become a major threat to hardware systems. Most modern digital IC designs utilize sequential elements which dominate the information leakage. This paper reports the first unified analysis and comprehensive comparison of known secure flip-flop circuits. We present a device level analysis of the information leakage from these FFs and propose several evaluation metrics to quantify their security. We show that simulated PA attacks that utilize the information evaluated by these metrics at the gate-level extract more information at the module-level.",

keywords = "CPA, Cryptography, DPA, countermeasures, flip-flops, power analysis, sequential-circuits, synchronous",

author = "Itamar Levi and Netanel Miller and Elad Avni and Osnat Keren and Alexander Fish",

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AU - Keren, Osnat

AU - Fish, Alexander

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AB - Side channel attacks have become a major threat to hardware systems. Most modern digital IC designs utilize sequential elements which dominate the information leakage. This paper reports the first unified analysis and comprehensive comparison of known secure flip-flop circuits. We present a device level analysis of the information leakage from these FFs and propose several evaluation metrics to quantify their security. We show that simulated PA attacks that utilize the information evaluated by these metrics at the gate-level extract more information at the module-level.

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KW - countermeasures

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A Survey of the Sensitivities of Security Oriented Flip-Flop Circuits

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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