A Survey of the Sensitivities of Security Oriented Flip-Flop Circuits

Itamar Levi, Netanel Miller, Elad Avni, Osnat Keren, Alexander Fish

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

Side channel attacks have become a major threat to hardware systems. Most modern digital IC designs utilize sequential elements which dominate the information leakage. This paper reports the first unified analysis and comprehensive comparison of known secure flip-flop circuits. We present a device level analysis of the information leakage from these FFs and propose several evaluation metrics to quantify their security. We show that simulated PA attacks that utilize the information evaluated by these metrics at the gate-level extract more information at the module-level.

Original languageEnglish
Article number8094119
Pages (from-to)24797-24809
Number of pages13
JournalIEEE Access
Volume5
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Nov 2017
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • CPA
  • Cryptography
  • DPA
  • countermeasures
  • flip-flops
  • power analysis
  • sequential-circuits
  • synchronous

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