Abstract
The disclosure policy of the firm defines the relationship between the actual outcome and the reported outcome. This paper offers a taxonomy of disclosur policies by analyzing the Nash equilibrium contract of the owner and the manager. The variety among firms is explained by different combinations (of preferences) of owner-manager pairings. When the owner's aversion to risk changes more slowly (quickly) than the manager's, the firm is a smoother (a maximizer). The firm tells the truth only the owner's and the manager's preferences behave the same.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 361-374 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Journal | Journal of Economics and Business |
Volume | 45 |
Issue number | 5 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Jan 1993 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Business, Management and Accounting
- Economics and Econometrics