A two-dimensional problem of revenue maximization

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5 Scopus citations


We consider the problem of finding the mechanism that maximizes the revenue of a seller of multiple objects. This problem turns out to be significantly more complex than the case where there is only a single object (which was solved by Myerson, 1981). The analysis is difficult even in the simplest case studied here, where there are two exclusive objects and a single buyer, with valuations uniformly distributed on triangular domains. We show that the optimal mechanisms are piecewise linear with either 2 or 3 pieces, and obtain explicit formulas for most cases of interest.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)718-727
Number of pages10
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Issue number6
StatePublished - 1 Dec 2011
Externally publishedYes


  • Auctions
  • Incentive compatibility
  • Mechanism design
  • Multi-dimensional mechanism design

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Applied Mathematics


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