Administrative failures in government credit programs

A. Braverman, J. L. Guasch

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

13 Scopus citations

Abstract

Most government interventions in rural credit markets have been unsuccessful as measured by the targeting of funds to small farmers, repayment rates, and the ability of financial institutions to survive the withdrawal of external funding. This chapter argues that these problems are related to the poor design of incentive systems within lending institutions and to government-imposed interest rate ceilings. It considers how to improve the administrative performance of banks and cooperatives, and the advantages (and shortcomings) of group lending. The apparently large influence of social and cultural factors on the performance of financial institutions suggests the need for experimentation among alternative modes of organization in lending and savings mobilization. -Authors

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe economics of rural organization
Subtitle of host publicationtheory, practice, and policy
EditorsKarla Ruth Hoff, Avishay Braverman, Josephy E. Stiglitz
PublisherOxford University Press, for World Bank
Pages53-69
Number of pages17
ISBN (Print)0195208889
StatePublished - 1 Jan 1993

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Environmental Science (all)
  • Earth and Planetary Sciences (all)

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