Aesthetic Normativity and the Acquisition of Empirical Concepts

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

In the Introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant claims that the Critique of Pure Reason accounted for the necessary conditions of experience and knowledge in general, but that it was not a complete transcendental account of the possibility of a particular empirical experience of objects and knowledge of empirical laws of nature. To fill this gap the third Critique puts forward, as an additional transcendental condition, the regulative principle of the purposiveness of nature. In this paper, I will attempt to show how Kant's account of pure aesthetic judgment can be read as articulating an aesthetic non-conceptual condition of the search for the conceptual order of nature and so as constituting an essential part of the account of the transcendental conditions of empirical experience and knowledge.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)71-104
Number of pages34
JournalCon-textos Kantianos
Volume12
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Dec 2020

Keywords

  • Aesthetic normativity
  • Beautiful form
  • Concept acquisition
  • Critique of the aesthetic power of judgment
  • Ginsborg
  • Natural kinds

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Aesthetic Normativity and the Acquisition of Empirical Concepts'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this