Abstract
This paper is concerned with the question of whether mature human experience is thoroughly conceptual, or whether it involves non-conceptual elements or layers. It has two central goals. The first goal is methodological. It aims to establish that that question is, to a large extent, an empirical question. The question cannot be answered by appealing to purely a priori and transcendental considerations. The second goal is to argue, inter alia by relying on empirical findings, that the view known as state-conceptualism is false. We will argue that our experiences do involve non-conceptual elements. That is, a subject may enjoy an experience with a particular phenomenal aspect, without possessing the concept needed for the specification of the content of that aspect, and moreover, without being able to acquire that concept upon having that experience.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1-25 |
Number of pages | 25 |
Journal | International Journal of Philosophical Studies |
Volume | 24 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Jan 2016 |
Keywords
- Perceptual experience
- attention
- conceptual content
- overflow arguments
- perceptual conceptualism
- phenomenal consciousness
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy