TY - JOUR
T1 - Against strong cognitivism
T2 - An argument from caring
AU - Jacobson, Hilla
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2014.
PY - 2014/5/27
Y1 - 2014/5/27
N2 - According to 'strong cognitivism', all reasons for action are rooted in normative features that the motivated subject (explicitly or implicitly) takes objects to have (or lack) independently of her attitudes towards these objects. My main concern in this paper is to argue against strong cognitivism, that is, to establish the view that conative attitudes do provide subjects with reasons for action. My central argument to this effect is a top-down one that proceeds by an analysis of the complex phenomenon of caring and derives a conclusion regarding the (motivational and normative) nature of more basic mental phenomena - particular desires.
AB - According to 'strong cognitivism', all reasons for action are rooted in normative features that the motivated subject (explicitly or implicitly) takes objects to have (or lack) independently of her attitudes towards these objects. My main concern in this paper is to argue against strong cognitivism, that is, to establish the view that conative attitudes do provide subjects with reasons for action. My central argument to this effect is a top-down one that proceeds by an analysis of the complex phenomenon of caring and derives a conclusion regarding the (motivational and normative) nature of more basic mental phenomena - particular desires.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84928828307&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/S0012217314001012
DO - 10.1017/S0012217314001012
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84928828307
SN - 0012-2173
VL - 54
SP - 139
EP - 158
JO - Dialogue-Canadian Philosophical Review
JF - Dialogue-Canadian Philosophical Review
IS - 1
ER -