Agent failures in all-pay auctions

Yoad Lewenberg, Omer Lev, Yoram Bachrach, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

5 Scopus citations


All-pay auctions, a common mechanism for various human and agent interactions, suffers, like many other mechanisms, from the possibility of players' failure to participate in the auction. We model such failures and show how they affect the equilibrium state, revealing various properties, such as the lack of influence of the most-likely-to-participate player on the behavior of the other players. We perform this analysis with two scenarios: the sum-profit model, where the auctioneer obtains the sum of all submitted bids, and the max-profit model of crowd-sourcing contests, where the auctioneer can only use the best submissions and thus obtains only the winning bid. Furthermore, we examine various methods of influencing the probability of participation such as the effects of misreporting one's own probability of participating, and how influencing another player's participation chances (e.g., sabotage) changes the player's strategy.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIJCAI 2013 - Proceedings of the 23rd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Number of pages7
StatePublished - 1 Dec 2013
Externally publishedYes
Event23rd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2013 - Beijing, China
Duration: 3 Aug 20139 Aug 2013

Publication series

NameIJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
ISSN (Print)1045-0823


Conference23rd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2013


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