Aggressive bidding of weak bidders in all-pay auction

Yizhaq Minchuk

Aggressive bidding of weak bidders in all-pay auction

Yizhaq Minchuk

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study an asymmetric all-pay auction with a general utility function, We show that high-type bidders in all-pay auction with lower density, are bidding more aggressively than bidders with higher density, This result is contradictory to the result in Parreiras and Rubinchik (2010) on aggressive bidding of strong bidders.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1665-1668
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Bulletin
Volume	34
Issue number	3
State	Published - 1 Jan 2014
Externally published	Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

General Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Cite this

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title = "Aggressive bidding of weak bidders in all-pay auction",

abstract = "We study an asymmetric all-pay auction with a general utility function, We show that high-type bidders in all-pay auction with lower density, are bidding more aggressively than bidders with higher density, This result is contradictory to the result in Parreiras and Rubinchik (2010) on aggressive bidding of strong bidders.",

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AB - We study an asymmetric all-pay auction with a general utility function, We show that high-type bidders in all-pay auction with lower density, are bidding more aggressively than bidders with higher density, This result is contradictory to the result in Parreiras and Rubinchik (2010) on aggressive bidding of strong bidders.

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JO - Economics Bulletin

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Aggressive bidding of weak bidders in all-pay auction

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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