Algorithm selection in bilateral negotiation

Litan Ilany, Ya'Akov Kobi Gal

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

3 Scopus citations


Despite the abundance of strategies in the literature on repeated negotiation under incomplete information, there is no single negotiation strategy that is optimal for all possible settings. Thus, agent designers face an "algorithm selection" problem - which negotiation strategy to choose when facing a new negotiation. Our approach to this problem is to prediet the performance of different strategies based on structural features of the domain and to select the negotiation strategy that is predicted to be most successful using a "meta-agent". This agent was able to outperform all of the finalists to the recent Automated Negotiation Agent Competition (ANAC). Our results have insights for agent-designers, demonstrating that "a little learning goes a long way", despite the inherent uncertainty associated with negotiation under incomplete information.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationLate-Breaking Developments in the Field of Artificial Intelligence - Papers Presented at the 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Technical Report
PublisherAI Access Foundation
Number of pages3
ISBN (Print)9781577356288
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2013
Event27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013 - Bellevue, WA, United States
Duration: 14 Jul 201318 Jul 2013

Publication series

NameAAAI Workshop - Technical Report


Conference27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityBellevue, WA

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Engineering


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