All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes

Yizhaq Minchuk, Aner Sela

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Scopus citations


We study all-pay auctions with multiple prizes. The players have the same value for all the certain prizes except for one uncertain prize for which each player has a private value. We characterize the equilibrium strategy and show that, independent of the ranking of the uncertain prize, if the uncertain prize is not the lowest one, a player's effort as well as his expected payoff increase in his value for the uncertain prize. Otherwise, if this prize is the lowest one, we obtain that a player's effort may decrease in his value for the uncertain prize but his expected utility increases.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)130-134
Number of pages5
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
StatePublished - 1 Nov 2014


  • All-pay auctions
  • Contests
  • Uncertain prizes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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