All-pay auctions with variable rewards

Todd Kaplan; Israel Luski; Aner Sela; David Wettstein

doi:10.1111/1467-6451.00184

All-pay auctions with variable rewards

Todd Kaplan, Israel Luski, Aner Sela, David Wettstein

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

48 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study all-pay auctions with variable rewards under incomplete information. In standard models, a reward depends on a bidder's privately known type; however, in our model it is also a function of his bid. We show that in such models there is a potential for paradoxical behavior where a reduction in the rewards or an increase in costs may increase the expected sum of bids or alternatively the expected highest bid.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	417-430
Number of pages	14
Journal	Journal of Industrial Economics
Volume	50
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6451.00184
State	Published - 1 Jan 2002

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Accounting
General Business, Management and Accounting
Economics and Econometrics

Access to Document

10.1111/1467-6451.00184

Cite this

@article{790ce35100c44de29dd33b9d56be2d4d,

title = "All-pay auctions with variable rewards",

abstract = "We study all-pay auctions with variable rewards under incomplete information. In standard models, a reward depends on a bidder's privately known type; however, in our model it is also a function of his bid. We show that in such models there is a potential for paradoxical behavior where a reduction in the rewards or an increase in costs may increase the expected sum of bids or alternatively the expected highest bid.",

author = "Todd Kaplan and Israel Luski and Aner Sela and David Wettstein",

year = "2002",

month = jan,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1111/1467-6451.00184",

language = "English",

volume = "50",

pages = "417--430",

journal = "Journal of Industrial Economics",

issn = "0022-1821",

publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd",

number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - All-pay auctions with variable rewards

AU - Kaplan, Todd

AU - Luski, Israel

AU - Sela, Aner

AU - Wettstein, David

PY - 2002/1/1

Y1 - 2002/1/1

N2 - We study all-pay auctions with variable rewards under incomplete information. In standard models, a reward depends on a bidder's privately known type; however, in our model it is also a function of his bid. We show that in such models there is a potential for paradoxical behavior where a reduction in the rewards or an increase in costs may increase the expected sum of bids or alternatively the expected highest bid.

AB - We study all-pay auctions with variable rewards under incomplete information. In standard models, a reward depends on a bidder's privately known type; however, in our model it is also a function of his bid. We show that in such models there is a potential for paradoxical behavior where a reduction in the rewards or an increase in costs may increase the expected sum of bids or alternatively the expected highest bid.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0036955658&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/1467-6451.00184

DO - 10.1111/1467-6451.00184

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0036955658

SN - 0022-1821

VL - 50

SP - 417

EP - 430

JO - Journal of Industrial Economics

JF - Journal of Industrial Economics

IS - 4

ER -

All-pay auctions with variable rewards

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this