An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments

David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

10 Scopus citations


We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for transferable utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)296-308
Number of pages13
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number1
StatePublished - 1 Mar 2006


  • Consistency
  • Fairness
  • Non-transferable utility games
  • Ordinal Shapley value
  • Shapley value

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


Dive into the research topics of 'An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this