Approachability with delayed information

David Lagziel, Ehud Lehrer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider a sequential decision problem where the decision maker is informed of the actual payoff with delay. We introduce a new condition, which generalizes the condition given by Blackwell and ensures that the decision maker can approach a fixed closed and convex set under delay. We show how the convergence rate to the approachable set is sensitive to changes in the information lag and apply our approachability strategy to games with one-sided incomplete information and to regret-free strategies.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)425-444
Number of pages20
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume157
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 May 2015
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Approachability
  • Delayed information
  • Imperfect and asymmetric information

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