Approximation and hardness of shift-bribery

Piotr Faliszewski, Pasin Manurangsi, Krzysztof Sornat

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

In the SHIFT-BRIBERY problem we are given an election, a preferred candidate, and the costs of shifting this preferred candidate up the voters' preference orders. The goal is to find such a set of shifts that ensures that the preferred candidate wins the election. We give the first polynomial-time approximation scheme for the case of positional scoring rules, and for the Copeland rule we show strong inapproximability results.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019
PublisherAAAI press
Pages1901-1908
Number of pages8
ISBN (Electronic)9781577358091
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2019
Externally publishedYes
Event33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Annual Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019 - Honolulu, United States
Duration: 27 Jan 20191 Feb 2019

Publication series

Name33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019

Conference

Conference33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2019, 31st Annual Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence, IAAI 2019 and the 9th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2019
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityHonolulu
Period27/01/191/02/19

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