Approximation and hardness of Shift-Bribery

Piotr Faliszewski, Pasin Manurangsi, Krzysztof Sornat

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations


In the SHIFT-BRIBERY problem we are given an election, a preferred candidate, and the costs of shifting this preferred candidate up the voters' preference orders. The goal is to find such a set of shifts that ensures that the preferred candidate wins the election. We give the first polynomial-time approximation scheme for the SHIFT-BRIBERY problem for the case of positional scoring rules, and for the Copeland rule we show strong inapproximability results.

Original languageEnglish
Article number103520
JournalArtificial Intelligence
StatePublished - 1 Sep 2021
Externally publishedYes


  • Algorithms
  • Approximation
  • Elections
  • Hardness
  • Shift-Bribery


Dive into the research topics of 'Approximation and hardness of Shift-Bribery'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this