Are policies promoting the transition to low-carbon vehicles associated with distributional injustice?

Are policies that encourage the transition to a low-carbon economy associated with distributional injustice?
Governments often use differentiated vehicle taxes to encourage the shift toward lower-emission cars. As car
markets are characterized by manufacturers’ market power, such policies can generate distributional injustices,
namely, unjust distribution of welfare across consumers, producers, and the environment. We examine whether
such a policy delivered a just transition to low-carbon vehicles by comparing equilibrium under policy vs. a nopolicy
counterfactual. We find evidence of distributional injustices under the policy: (1) manufacturers captured
substantial benefits by increasing markups on low-carbon vehicles, (2) despite public financing, affordability of
low-carbon vehicles did not improve as planned, and consumer surplus declined, and (3) emissions decreased
only marginally. We suggest reinstating a uniform vehicle tax, paired with sales requirements for low-carbon
vehicles imposed on manufacturers. This combination would likely curb manufacturers’ appropriation of consumer
surplus and support a just transition.