Asymmetric first-price auctions - A perturbation approach

Gadi Fibich, Arieh Gavious

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

37 Scopus citations


We use perturbation analysis to obtain explicit approximations of the equilibrium bids in asymmetric first-price auctions with n bidders, in which bidders' valuations are independently drawn from different distribution functions. Several applications are presented: explicit approximations of the seller's expected revenue, the maximal bid, the optimal reserve price, inefficiency, and a consequence of stochastic dominance. We also suggest an improved numerical method for calculating the seller's expected revenue.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)836-852
Number of pages17
JournalMathematics of Operations Research
Issue number4
StatePublished - 1 Nov 2003


  • Asymmetric auctions
  • Perturbation analysis

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Mathematics (all)
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Management Science and Operations Research


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