Asymptotic analysis of large auctions

Gadi Fibich, Arieh Gavious, Aner Sela

Research output: Working paper/PreprintDiscussion paper


We study private-value auctions with a large number of bidders. We calculate approximations of the equilibrium bids and the seller's revenue in first-price auctions regardless of whether the bidders are symmetric or asymmetric, or risk-neutral or risk-averse. Furthermore, we show that first-price auctions with asymmetric bidders, or risk-averse bidders, are asymptotically revenue equivalent to wide classes of standard auctions.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationBeer Sheva
Publisherהוצאת אוניברסיטת בן-גוריון בנגב
Number of pages38
StatePublished - 2004

Publication series

NameDiscussion paper / Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Monaster Center for Economic Research
PublisherMonaster Center for Economic Research, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Volumeno. 04-02, 2004


  • Asymptotic methods
  • asymmetric auctions
  • revenue equivalence
  • collusion
  • large auctions
  • risk-averse bidders


Dive into the research topics of 'Asymptotic analysis of large auctions'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this