@techreport{b0425d6e094b4ed4a3d27ac9dbe4e8c7,
title = "Asymptotic analysis of large auctions",
abstract = "We study private-value auctions with a large number of bidders. We calculate approximations of the equilibrium bids and the seller's revenue in first-price auctions regardless of whether the bidders are symmetric or asymmetric, or risk-neutral or risk-averse. Furthermore, we show that first-price auctions with asymmetric bidders, or risk-averse bidders, are asymptotically revenue equivalent to wide classes of standard auctions.",
keywords = "Asymptotic methods, asymmetric auctions, revenue equivalence, collusion, large auctions, risk-averse bidders",
author = "Gadi Fibich and Arieh Gavious and Aner Sela",
year = "2004",
language = "English",
series = "Discussion paper / Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Monaster Center for Economic Research",
publisher = "הוצאת אוניברסיטת בן-גוריון בנגב",
address = "Israel",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "הוצאת אוניברסיטת בן-גוריון בנגב",
}