Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values

Gadi Fibich; Arieh Gavious

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2010.02.040

Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values

Gadi Fibich
, Arieh Gavious

Department of Industrial Engineering and Management

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

We prove an asymptotic revenue equivalence among weakly asymmetric auctions with interdependent values, in which bidders have either asymmetric utility functions or asymmetric distributions of signals.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	496-507
Number of pages	12
Journal	European Journal of Operational Research
Volume	206
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2010.02.040
State	Published - 16 Oct 2010

Keywords

Asymmetric auctions
Interdependent values
Perturbation analysis
Revenue equivalence

ASJC Scopus subject areas

General Computer Science
Modeling and Simulation
Management Science and Operations Research
Information Systems and Management

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10.1016/j.ejor.2010.02.040

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title = "Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values",

abstract = "We prove an asymptotic revenue equivalence among weakly asymmetric auctions with interdependent values, in which bidders have either asymmetric utility functions or asymmetric distributions of signals.",

keywords = "Asymmetric auctions, Interdependent values, Perturbation analysis, Revenue equivalence",

author = "Gadi Fibich and Arieh Gavious",

year = "2010",

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doi = "10.1016/j.ejor.2010.02.040",

language = "English",

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journal = "European Journal of Operational Research",

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T1 - Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values

AU - Fibich, Gadi

AU - Gavious, Arieh

PY - 2010/10/16

Y1 - 2010/10/16

N2 - We prove an asymptotic revenue equivalence among weakly asymmetric auctions with interdependent values, in which bidders have either asymmetric utility functions or asymmetric distributions of signals.

AB - We prove an asymptotic revenue equivalence among weakly asymmetric auctions with interdependent values, in which bidders have either asymmetric utility functions or asymmetric distributions of signals.

KW - Asymmetric auctions

KW - Interdependent values

KW - Perturbation analysis

KW - Revenue equivalence

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/77950370291

U2 - 10.1016/j.ejor.2010.02.040

DO - 10.1016/j.ejor.2010.02.040

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:77950370291

SN - 0377-2217

VL - 206

SP - 496

EP - 507

JO - European Journal of Operational Research

JF - European Journal of Operational Research

IS - 2

ER -

Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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