@techreport{8c514555870b41ddb56473043aff0dfe,
title = "Auctions with weakley asymmetric interdependent values",
abstract = "We study second price auctions with weakly asymmetric interdependent values where bidders' signals for the value are independently and identically distributed. We also prove an asymptotic revenue equivalence among all standard auctions with weakly asymmetric interdependent values.",
keywords = "Weakly assymetric auctions, interdependent values, perturbation analysis",
author = "Gadi Fibich and Arieh Gavious and Aner Sela",
year = "2003",
language = "English",
series = "Discussion paper series (Monaster Center for Economic Research. Ben-Gurion University of the Negev)",
publisher = "הוצאת אוניברסיטת בן-גוריון בנגב",
address = "Israel",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "הוצאת אוניברסיטת בן-גוריון בנגב",
}