Bargaining, coalitions and competition

Nir Dagan, Roberto Serrano, Oscar Volij

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

13 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study a Gale-like matching model in a large exchange economy, in which trade takes place through non-cooperative bargaining in coalitions of finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with the Walrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof makes use of the theory of the core. With respect to previous work, our positive implementation result applies to a substantially larger class of economies: the model relaxes differentiability and convexity of preferences, and also admits an arbitrary number of divisible and indivisible goods.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)279-296
Number of pages18
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume15
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2000
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Core
  • Finite coalitions and Edgeworthian theory of exchange
  • Marginal rates of substitution and Jevonsian theory of exchange
  • Matching and bargaining
  • Walrasian equilibrium

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