Best-of-three all-pay auctions

Aner Sela

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.03.021

Best-of-three all-pay auctions

Aner Sela

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

20 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study a best-of-three all-pay auction. It is shown that with values of winning and without values of losing, this auction is less productive (the players' total expected effort is smaller) than the one-stage all-pay auction. However, with different values of losing over the contest's stages it may be more productive than the one-stage all-pay auction.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	67-70
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	112
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.03.021
State	Published - 1 Jul 2011

Keywords

All-pay auctions
Best-of-three contests
Multi-stage contests

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2011.03.021

Cite this

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AB - We study a best-of-three all-pay auction. It is shown that with values of winning and without values of losing, this auction is less productive (the players' total expected effort is smaller) than the one-stage all-pay auction. However, with different values of losing over the contest's stages it may be more productive than the one-stage all-pay auction.

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Best-of-three all-pay auctions

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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