Abstract
We study a best-of-three all-pay auction. It is shown that with values of winning and without values of losing, this auction is less productive (the players' total expected effort is smaller) than the one-stage all-pay auction. However, with different values of losing over the contest's stages it may be more productive than the one-stage all-pay auction.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 67-70 |
| Number of pages | 4 |
| Journal | Economics Letters |
| Volume | 112 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1 Jul 2011 |
Keywords
- All-pay auctions
- Best-of-three contests
- Multi-stage contests
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics