Beyond Bayes's Theorem: Effect of Base-Rate Information in Consensus Games

Sharon Gilat, Joachim Meyer, Ido Erev, Daniel Gopher

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

10 Scopus citations

Abstract

Many of the practical implications of behavioral decision-making research are based on the assumption that behavioral trends have to be compared with normative prescriptions. The present article demonstrates that in certain settings this approach is both inapplicable because there is no "normative" prescription and unnecessary because robust quantitative predictions can be made without reference to normative prescriptions. Experiment 1 demonstrates that a simple learning rule can be used to predict the base-rate effect in consensus games with multiple equilibria. Experiment 2 shows that information about the payoff rule affects participants' initial propensities but does not affect the learning process. Some implications of these results for the understanding of decision groups in social contexts, such as employment decisions in organizations, are pointed out.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)83-104
Number of pages22
JournalJournal of Experimental Psychology: Applied
Volume3
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 1997

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