Beyond plurality: Truth-bias in binary scoring rules

Svetlana Obraztsova, Omer Lev, Evangelos Markakis, Zinovi Rabinovich, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

It is well known that standard game-theoretic approaches to voting mechanisms lead to a multitude of Nash Equilibria (NE), many of which are counter-intuitive. We focus on truth-biased voters, a model recently proposed to avoid such issues. The model introduces an incentive for voters to be truthful when their vote is not pivotal. This is a powerful refinement, and recent simulations reveal that the surviving equilibria tend to have desirable properties. However, truth-bias has been studied only within the context of plurality elections, which is an extreme example of k-approval rules with k = 1. We undertake an equilibrium analysis of the complete range of k-approval rules (except veto).

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAAMAS 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
EditorsRafael H. Bordini, Pinar Yolum, Edith Elkind, Gerhard Weiss
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages1733-1734
Number of pages2
ISBN (Electronic)9781450337717
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2015
Externally publishedYes
Event14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2015 - Istanbul, Turkey
Duration: 4 May 20158 May 2015

Publication series

NameProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
Volume3
ISSN (Print)1548-8403
ISSN (Electronic)1558-2914

Conference

Conference14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2015
Country/TerritoryTurkey
CityIstanbul
Period4/05/158/05/15

Keywords

  • Nash equilibrium
  • Plurality
  • Social choice
  • Truth bias
  • Veto

Cite this