@inproceedings{b4ec7270206e4539839796d92cc32a10,
title = "Beyond plurality: Truth-bias in binary scoring rules",
abstract = "It is well known that standard game-theoretic approaches to voting mechanisms lead to a multitude of Nash Equilibria (NE), many of which are counter-intuitive. We focus on truth-biased voters, a model recently proposed to avoid such issues. The model introduces an incentive for voters to be truthful when their vote is not pivotal. This is a powerful refinement, and recent simulations reveal that the surviving equilibria tend to have desirable properties. However, truth-bias has been studied only within the context of plurality elections, which is an extreme example of k-approval rules with k = 1. We undertake an equilibrium analysis of the complete range of k-approval rules (except veto).",
keywords = "Nash equilibrium, Plurality, Social choice, Truth bias, Veto",
author = "Svetlana Obraztsova and Omer Lev and Evangelos Markakis and Zinovi Rabinovich and Rosenschein, {Jeffrey S.}",
note = "Publisher Copyright: Copyright {\textcopyright} 2015, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.; 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2015 ; Conference date: 04-05-2015 Through 08-05-2015",
year = "2015",
month = jan,
day = "1",
language = "English",
series = "Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS",
publisher = "International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)",
pages = "1733--1734",
editor = "Bordini, {Rafael H.} and Pinar Yolum and Edith Elkind and Gerhard Weiss",
booktitle = "AAMAS 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems",
}