Bilateral comparisons and consistent fair division rules in the context of bankruptcy problems

Nir Dagan; Oscar Volij

doi:10.1007/BF01262509

Bilateral comparisons and consistent fair division rules in the context of bankruptcy problems

Nir Dagan, Oscar Volij

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

25 Scopus citations

Abstract

We analyze the problem of extending a given bilateral principle of justice to a consistent n-creditor bankruptcy rule. Based on the bilateral principle, we build a family of binary relations on the set of creditors in order to make bilateral comparisons between them. We find that the possibility of extending a specific bilateral principle of justice in a consistent way is closely related to the quasi-transitivity of the binary relations mentioned above.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	11-25
Number of pages	15
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	26
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01262509
State	Published - 1 Jan 1997
Externally published	Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Statistics and Probability
Mathematics (miscellaneous)
Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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10.1007/BF01262509

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abstract = "We analyze the problem of extending a given bilateral principle of justice to a consistent n-creditor bankruptcy rule. Based on the bilateral principle, we build a family of binary relations on the set of creditors in order to make bilateral comparisons between them. We find that the possibility of extending a specific bilateral principle of justice in a consistent way is closely related to the quasi-transitivity of the binary relations mentioned above.",

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Bilateral comparisons and consistent fair division rules in the context of bankruptcy problems

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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