TY - JOUR
T1 - Bilateralism, coherence, and incoherence
AU - Golan, Rea
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 The Author(s). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Philosophy and Phenonmenological Research Inc.
PY - 2024/1/1
Y1 - 2024/1/1
N2 - Bilateralism is the view that the speech act of denial is as primitive as that of assertion. Bilateralism has proved helpful in providing an intuitive interpretation of formalisms that, prima facie, look counterintuitive, namely, multiple-conclusion sequent calculi. Under this interpretation, a sequent of the form (Formula presented.) is regarded as the statement that it is incoherent, according to our conversational norms, to occupy the position of asserting all the sentences in (Formula presented.) and denying all the sentences in (Formula presented.). Some have argued, based on this interpretation, that the notion of invalidity is as conceptually primitive and important as the notion of validity: whereas the latter is couched in terms of what positions are incoherent and hence untenable, the former is couched in terms of what positions are coherent and hence tenable. My ultimate goal in this paper is to contest this view. Based on a novel technical account of the two notions—one that I find more accurate than the existing accounts in the literature—I shall argue that the notion of incoherence takes conceptual priority over the notion of coherence.
AB - Bilateralism is the view that the speech act of denial is as primitive as that of assertion. Bilateralism has proved helpful in providing an intuitive interpretation of formalisms that, prima facie, look counterintuitive, namely, multiple-conclusion sequent calculi. Under this interpretation, a sequent of the form (Formula presented.) is regarded as the statement that it is incoherent, according to our conversational norms, to occupy the position of asserting all the sentences in (Formula presented.) and denying all the sentences in (Formula presented.). Some have argued, based on this interpretation, that the notion of invalidity is as conceptually primitive and important as the notion of validity: whereas the latter is couched in terms of what positions are incoherent and hence untenable, the former is couched in terms of what positions are coherent and hence tenable. My ultimate goal in this paper is to contest this view. Based on a novel technical account of the two notions—one that I find more accurate than the existing accounts in the literature—I shall argue that the notion of incoherence takes conceptual priority over the notion of coherence.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85206314624&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/phpr.13115
DO - 10.1111/phpr.13115
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85206314624
SN - 0031-8205
JO - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
JF - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
ER -