TY - CHAP
T1 - Bordering Disputed Territories
T2 - The European Union’s Technical Customs Rules and Israel’s Occupation
AU - Gordon, Neve
AU - Pardo, Sharon
PY - 2015/6
Y1 - 2015/6
N2 - In January 2005, the European Union (EU) decided to implement fully the rules of origin (ROO) clause (Pardo and Peters, 2012, Doc. 5/12)1 of the 1995 European Community (EC)-Israel Association Agreement (Doc. 4/23) and to subject products manufactured in the territories Israel had occupied during the 1967 war to customs duty. The EU’s decision spurred a scholarly debate about its legal basis (Hirsch, 1998, 2002–2003; Paasivirta, 1999; Hauswaldt, 2003; Zemer and Pardo, 2003; Aoun, 2003; Harpaz, 2004; Pardo and Peters, 2010), the implications it would likely have on Europe’s normative positions (Harpaz, 2008; Harpaz and Rubinson, 2010; Pardo and Zemer, 2011), and on whether it is consistent with the EU’s policies involving rules of origin in other regions (Pardo and Zemer, 2011; Rubinson, 2011). Surprisingly, though, no one has examined the actual economic and political implications of applying the ROO on Israeli products manufactured in the Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank and the Golan Heights.2 Put differently, the implementation of the ROO is the EU’s attempt to use technical customs rules to reassert the Green Line, and it is important to determine whether the effort to redraw an international border — that the Israeli government has wittingly tried to erase — has actually had an impact on Israeli industry in the occupied territories (OT) or on Israel’s settlement policies.
AB - In January 2005, the European Union (EU) decided to implement fully the rules of origin (ROO) clause (Pardo and Peters, 2012, Doc. 5/12)1 of the 1995 European Community (EC)-Israel Association Agreement (Doc. 4/23) and to subject products manufactured in the territories Israel had occupied during the 1967 war to customs duty. The EU’s decision spurred a scholarly debate about its legal basis (Hirsch, 1998, 2002–2003; Paasivirta, 1999; Hauswaldt, 2003; Zemer and Pardo, 2003; Aoun, 2003; Harpaz, 2004; Pardo and Peters, 2010), the implications it would likely have on Europe’s normative positions (Harpaz, 2008; Harpaz and Rubinson, 2010; Pardo and Zemer, 2011), and on whether it is consistent with the EU’s policies involving rules of origin in other regions (Pardo and Zemer, 2011; Rubinson, 2011). Surprisingly, though, no one has examined the actual economic and political implications of applying the ROO on Israeli products manufactured in the Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank and the Golan Heights.2 Put differently, the implementation of the ROO is the EU’s attempt to use technical customs rules to reassert the Green Line, and it is important to determine whether the effort to redraw an international border — that the Israeli government has wittingly tried to erase — has actually had an impact on Israeli industry in the occupied territories (OT) or on Israel’s settlement policies.
KW - European Union
KW - Gaza Strip
KW - Custom Duty
KW - Occupied Territory
KW - Association Agreement
U2 - 10.1057/9781137504142_5
DO - 10.1057/9781137504142_5
M3 - Chapter
SN - 9781137504135
T3 - Palgrave Studies in International Relations
SP - 86
EP - 106
BT - Fragmented Borders, Interdependence and External Relations
A2 - Del Sarto , Raffaella A
PB - Palgrave Macmillan
ER -