Bribery as a Measure of Candidate Success: Complexity Results for Approval-Based Multiwinner Rules

Piotr Faliszewski, Piotr Skowron, Nimrod Talmon

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

27 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study the problem of bribery in inultiwiniier elections, for the case where the voters cast approval ballots (i.e., sets of candidates they approve) and the bribery actions are limited to: Adding an approval to a vote, deleting an approval from a vote, or moving an approval within a vote from one candidate to the other. We consider a number of approval-based inultiwiniier rules (AV, SAV, GAV, RAV, approval-based Chamberlin-Courant, and PAV). We find the landscape of complexity results quite rich, going from polynomial-Time algorithms through NP-hardness with constant-factor approximations, to outright inapproxiinability. Moreover, in general, our problems tend to be easier when we limit out bribery actions oil increasing the number of approvals of the candidate that we want to be in a winning committee (i.e., adding approvals only for this preferred candidate, or moving approvals ouly to him or her). We also study parameterized complexity of our problems, with a focus on parameterizations by the numbers of voters or candidates.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017
EditorsEdmund Durfee, Sanmay Das, Kate Larson, Michael Winikoff
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages6-14
Number of pages9
ISBN (Electronic)9781510855076
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2017
Externally publishedYes
Event16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017 - Sao Paulo, Brazil
Duration: 8 May 201712 May 2017

Publication series

NameProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
Volume1
ISSN (Print)1548-8403
ISSN (Electronic)1558-2914

Conference

Conference16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017
Country/TerritoryBrazil
CitySao Paulo
Period8/05/1712/05/17

Keywords

  • Approval-based voting
  • Bribery
  • Multiwinner elections

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Software
  • Control and Systems Engineering

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