TY - GEN
T1 - Bribery as a Measure of Candidate Success
T2 - 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017
AU - Faliszewski, Piotr
AU - Skowron, Piotr
AU - Talmon, Nimrod
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Copyright 2017, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All Rights Reserved.
PY - 2017/1/1
Y1 - 2017/1/1
N2 - We study the problem of bribery in inultiwiniier elections, for the case where the voters cast approval ballots (i.e., sets of candidates they approve) and the bribery actions are limited to: Adding an approval to a vote, deleting an approval from a vote, or moving an approval within a vote from one candidate to the other. We consider a number of approval-based inultiwiniier rules (AV, SAV, GAV, RAV, approval-based Chamberlin-Courant, and PAV). We find the landscape of complexity results quite rich, going from polynomial-Time algorithms through NP-hardness with constant-factor approximations, to outright inapproxiinability. Moreover, in general, our problems tend to be easier when we limit out bribery actions oil increasing the number of approvals of the candidate that we want to be in a winning committee (i.e., adding approvals only for this preferred candidate, or moving approvals ouly to him or her). We also study parameterized complexity of our problems, with a focus on parameterizations by the numbers of voters or candidates.
AB - We study the problem of bribery in inultiwiniier elections, for the case where the voters cast approval ballots (i.e., sets of candidates they approve) and the bribery actions are limited to: Adding an approval to a vote, deleting an approval from a vote, or moving an approval within a vote from one candidate to the other. We consider a number of approval-based inultiwiniier rules (AV, SAV, GAV, RAV, approval-based Chamberlin-Courant, and PAV). We find the landscape of complexity results quite rich, going from polynomial-Time algorithms through NP-hardness with constant-factor approximations, to outright inapproxiinability. Moreover, in general, our problems tend to be easier when we limit out bribery actions oil increasing the number of approvals of the candidate that we want to be in a winning committee (i.e., adding approvals only for this preferred candidate, or moving approvals ouly to him or her). We also study parameterized complexity of our problems, with a focus on parameterizations by the numbers of voters or candidates.
KW - Approval-based voting
KW - Bribery
KW - Multiwinner elections
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85046429082&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85046429082
T3 - Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
SP - 6
EP - 14
BT - 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017
A2 - Durfee, Edmund
A2 - Das, Sanmay
A2 - Larson, Kate
A2 - Winikoff, Michael
PB - International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Y2 - 8 May 2017 through 12 May 2017
ER -
