Abstract
We study a sequential two-stage all-pay auction with two identical prizes. In each stage, the players compete for one prize and each player can win either one or two prizes. The designer may impose a cap on the players' bids in each of the stages. We analyze the equilibrium in this sequential all-pay auction with bid caps and show that capping the players' bids is profitable for a designer who wishes to maximize the players' expected total bid.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 608-617 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| Journal | Economic Inquiry |
| Volume | 52 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1 Apr 2014 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Business, Management and Accounting
- Economics and Econometrics