Caps in sequential contests

Reut Megidish, Aner Sela

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study a sequential two-stage all-pay auction with two identical prizes. In each stage, the players compete for one prize and each player can win either one or two prizes. The designer may impose a cap on the players' bids in each of the stages. We analyze the equilibrium in this sequential all-pay auction with bid caps and show that capping the players' bids is profitable for a designer who wishes to maximize the players' expected total bid.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)608-617
Number of pages10
JournalEconomic Inquiry
Volume52
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Apr 2014

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Business, Management and Accounting
  • Economics and Econometrics

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