Cartesian Minds

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In this paper I propose a new argument against the Cartesian conception of the mind. I start by showing that if this conception assumes either of the two main versions of nominalism – extreme nominalism and trope theory – it is inconsistent. I then show that if it assumes either extreme nominalism or realism it is unintelligible. However, the Cartesian conception must assume either nominalism or realism, since these views are jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive. I conclude therefore that this conception is either inconsistent, or unintelligible or both.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPapers from the 25th International Wittgenstein Symposia in Kirchberg am Wechsel
EditorsChr. Kanzian, J. Quitterer, E. Runggaldier
StatePublished - 2002


  • Bewußtseinsphilosophie, Philosophie des Geistes und der Psychologie
  • Kirchberg 2002
  • philosophy
  • 20th century philosophy
  • realism
  • mind vs body
  • simplicity
  • nominalism
  • bundle theory
  • trope theory


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