Clubs in an urban setting

In this paper the properties of a congestable concentrated local public good (CCoLPG) are described, taking into account both locational aspects and congestion. This discussion, therefore, completes the analysis of congestable local public goods (LPG) which was started in our earlier paper (Congestable local public goods in an urban setting, J. Urban Econ., 290-310 (1982). It is here shown that the optimal provision of CCoLPG leads to the creation of clubs, where the government has to determine the location and provide the optimal quantity of LPG in each club and also levy congestion tolls on users according to their level of utilization of the club. Congestion tolls cover the αest part of the costs, where α is the level of congestability of the CCoLPG. The rest of the costs are covered by taxing land rents. Clubs will form, possibly more than one per city, even if the LPG is pure (i.e., α = 0) and they will contain a single household if the LPG is private (i.e., α = 1). The difference between these results and those of classical club theorists stem from the fact that here we also take into account the limited supply of land of given accessibility (i.e., locational aspects), which like congestion lead to the creation of clubs. When these two factors are considered together, it explains why congestion tolls alone are not sufficient to finance clubs' operations, or why pure LPGs also have to be provided locally, etc.