Ran Eilat, Kfir Eliaz

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We consider the problem faced by a group of players who bargain over what public signal to acquire before deciding on a collective action. The players differ in their privately known state-dependent payoffs from taking the action, and therefore differ also in their willingness to pay for the public signal. We take a mechanism design approach to characterizing the efficient frontier of outcomes achievable via bargaining over information. We identify novel distortions in the optimal information structure that arise from the information asymmetry and from the fact that after the signal is realized, the outcome is determined in equilibrium of a subsequent voting game.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1269-1317
Number of pages49
JournalJournal of the European Economic Association
Issue number4
StatePublished - 1 Aug 2023

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Economics, Econometrics and Finance


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