Combinatorial voter control in elections

Laurent Bulteau, Jiehua Chen, Piotr Faliszewski, Rolf Niedermeier, Nimrod Talmon

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

18 Scopus citations


Voter control problems model situations such as an external agent trying to affect the result of an election by adding voters, for example by convincing some voters to vote who would otherwise not attend the election. Traditionally, voters are added one at a time, with the goal of making a distinguished alternative win by adding a minimum number of voters. In this paper, we initiate the study of combinatorial variants of control by adding voters. In our setting, when we choose to add a voter v, we also have to add a whole bundle κ(v) of voters associated with v. We study the computational complexity of this problem for two of the most basic voting rules, namely the Plurality rule and the Condorcet rule.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)99-120
Number of pages22
JournalTheoretical Computer Science
StatePublished - 19 Jul 2015
Externally publishedYes


  • Condorcet's rule
  • Domain restrictions
  • NP-hard election control problem
  • Parameterized complexity
  • The Plurality rule
  • Voting

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • General Computer Science


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