TY - JOUR
T1 - Committee scoring rules
T2 - Axiomatic characterization and hierarchy
AU - Faliszewski, Piotr
AU - Skowron, Piotr
AU - Slinko, Arkadii
AU - Talmon, Nimrod
N1 - Funding Information:
Piotr Faliszewski was supported by the National Science Centre, Poland, under Project No. 2016/21/B/ST6/01509. Arkadii Slinko was supported by the Royal Society of NZ Marsden Fund No. UOA-254. Piotr Skowron was supported by a Humboldt Research Fellowship for Postdoctoral Researchers and by the Foundation for Polish Science within the Homing programme (Project title: “Normative Comparison of Multiwinner Election Rules”). Nimrod Talmon was supported by a postdoctoral fellowship from I-CORE ALGO. Authors’ addresses: P. Faliszewski, AGH University, al. Mickiewicza 30, 30-059, Krakow, Poland; email: faliszew@ agh.edu.pl; P. Skowron, University of Warsaw, ul. Krakowskie Przedmiescie 26/28, 00-927 Warszawa, Poland; email: p.skowron@mimuw.edu.pl; A. Slinko, Department of Mathematics, The University of Auckland, Private Bag 92019, Auckland 1142, New Zealand; email: a.slinko@auckland.ac.nz; N. Talmon, Ben-Gurion University, Ben-Gurion Boulevard 1, Be’er Sheva, Israel; email: talmonn@bgu.ac.il. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. © 2019 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM. 2167-8375/2019/01-ART3 $15.00 https://doi.org/10.1145/3296672
Funding Information:
Piotr Faliszewski was supported by the National Science Centre, Poland, under Project No. 2016/21/B/ST6/01509. Arkadii Slinko was supported by the Royal Society of NZ Marsden Fund No. UOA-254. Piotr Skowron was supported by a Humboldt Research Fellowship for Postdoctoral Researchers and by the Foundation for Polish Science within the Homing programme (Project title: "Normative Comparison of Multiwinner Election Rules"). Nimrod Talmon was supported by a postdoctoral fellowship from I-CORE ALGO.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Copyright held by the owner/author(s).
PY - 2019/1/1
Y1 - 2019/1/1
N2 - Committee scoring voting rules are multiwinner analogues of positional scoring rules, which constitute an important subclass of single-winner voting rules. We identify several natural subclasses of committee scoring rules, namely, weakly separable, representation-focused, top-k-counting, OWA-based, and decomposable rules.We characterize SNTV, Bloc, and k-Approval Chamberlin-Courant as the only nontrivial rules in pairwise intersections of these classes. We provide some axiomatic characterizations for these classes, where monotonicity properties appear to be especially useful. The class of decomposable rules is new to the literature. We show that it strictly contains the class of OWA-based rules and describe some of the applications of decomposable rules.
AB - Committee scoring voting rules are multiwinner analogues of positional scoring rules, which constitute an important subclass of single-winner voting rules. We identify several natural subclasses of committee scoring rules, namely, weakly separable, representation-focused, top-k-counting, OWA-based, and decomposable rules.We characterize SNTV, Bloc, and k-Approval Chamberlin-Courant as the only nontrivial rules in pairwise intersections of these classes. We provide some axiomatic characterizations for these classes, where monotonicity properties appear to be especially useful. The class of decomposable rules is new to the literature. We show that it strictly contains the class of OWA-based rules and describe some of the applications of decomposable rules.
KW - Axiomatic characterization
KW - Axioms
KW - Classification
KW - Committee election
KW - Multiwinner voting
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85061210484&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/3296672
DO - 10.1145/3296672
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85061210484
SN - 2167-8375
VL - 7
JO - ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
JF - ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
IS - 1
M1 - 3
ER -