Committee scoring rules: Axiomatic characterization and hierarchy

Piotr Faliszewski, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko, Nimrod Talmon

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

11 Scopus citations

Abstract

Committee scoring voting rules are multiwinner analogues of positional scoring rules, which constitute an important subclass of single-winner voting rules. We identify several natural subclasses of committee scoring rules, namely, weakly separable, representation-focused, top-k-counting, OWA-based, and decomposable rules.We characterize SNTV, Bloc, and k-Approval Chamberlin-Courant as the only nontrivial rules in pairwise intersections of these classes. We provide some axiomatic characterizations for these classes, where monotonicity properties appear to be especially useful. The class of decomposable rules is new to the literature. We show that it strictly contains the class of OWA-based rules and describe some of the applications of decomposable rules.

Original languageEnglish
Article number3
JournalACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Volume7
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2019

Keywords

  • Axiomatic characterization
  • Axioms
  • Classification
  • Committee election
  • Multiwinner voting

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