Committee Scoring Rules, Banzhaf Values, and Approximation Algorithms

Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Martin Lackner, Dominik Peters, Nimrod Talmon

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We consider committee scoring rules (a family of multiwinner voting rules) and define a class of cooperative games based on elections held according to these rules. We show that there is a polynomial-time algorithm for computing the
Banzhaf value for a large subclass of these games and we show, using this Banzhaf value, an appealing heuristic algorithm for computing winning committees. We evaluate this algorithm experimentally for the case of the Chamberlin-Courant voting rule.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication4th Workshop on Exploring Beyond the Worst Case in Computational Social Choice (EXPLORE 2017).
Subtitle of host publicationHeld as part of the 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2017)
EditorsHaris Aziz, John P. Dickerson, Omer Lev, Nicholas Mattei
Pages24-31
Number of pages8
StatePublished - May 2017

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