Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information

Ezra Einy, Mridu Prabal Goswami, Ori Haimanko, Ram Orzach, Aner Sela

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study two-player common-value all-pay auctions in which the players have ex-ante asymmetric information represented by finite connected partitions of the set of states of nature. Our focus is on a family of such auctions in which no player has an information advantage over his opponent. We find sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium with monotone strategies, and show that such an equilibrium is unique. We further show that the ex-ante distribution of equilibrium effort is the same for every player (and hence the players’ expected efforts are equal), although their expected payoffs are different and they do not have the same ex-ante probability of winning.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)79-102
Number of pages24
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume46
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Mar 2017

Keywords

  • Asymmetric information
  • Common-value all-pay auctions

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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